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ISSUES
Did the Eleventh Circuit properly
hold that a district court's order
compelling arbitration and dismiss-
ing with prejudice the plaintiffs'
individual and class claims consti-
tuted a "final decision" that was
subject to immediate review under
the Federal Arbitration Act?
Did the Eleventh Circuit properly
hold that an arbitration clause was
unenforceable because it was silent
on the issue of costs and fees that
the plaintiff might be required to
bear in order to vindicate her statu-
tory rights, and because it did not
give the plaintiff the opportunity to
use all the class action procedures
available under the Truth in
Lending Act?
FACTS
Larketta Randolph purchased a
mobile home in 1994 from Better
Cents Home Builders Inc., in
Opelika, Ala. She financed her pur-
chase through Green Tree Financial
Corp.-Alabama, a wholly owned
subsidiary of Green Tree Financial
Corporation (now known as
Conseco Finance Corp.). According
to Randolph, Green Tree required
her to obtain "vendor's single inter-
est" insurance, which protects a
vendor or lienholder against the
costs of repossession in the event of
default. Green Tree did not mention
this requirement in its Truth in
Lending Act disclosure.
Randolph's installment contract
with Better Cents named Green
Tree as the assignee. The contract
contained an arbitration agreement,
providing, in part, as follows:
ARBITRATION; All disputes, claims
or controversies arising from or
relating to this Contract or the rela-
tions which result from this
Contract, or the validity of this
Contract, shall be resolved by bind-
ing arbitration by one arbitrator
(Continued on Page 14)
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selected by Assignee with consent of
Buyer(s). This arbitration Contract
is made pursuant to a transaction in
interstate commerce, and shall be
governed by the Federal Arbitration
Act at 9 U.S.C. Section 1. Judgment
upon the award rendered may be
entered in any court having juris-
diction. The parties agree and
understand that they choose arbi-
tration instead of litigation to
resolve disputes. The parties under-
stand that they have a right or
opportunity to resolve their disputes
through arbitration, except as pro-
vided herein. THE PARTIES VOL-
UNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY
WAIVE ANY RIGHT THEY HAVE
TO A JURY TRIAL EITHER PUR-
SUANT TO ARBITRATION UNDER
THIS CLAUSE OR PURSUANT TO A
COURT ACTION BY ASSIGNEE (AS
PROVIDED HEREIN). The parties
agree and understand that all dis-
putes arising under case law, statu-
tory law, and all other laws includ-
ing, but not limited to binding arbi-
tration in accord with this Contract.
The parties agree and understand
that the arbitrator shall have all
powers provided by the law and the
Contract ... [including] money dam-
ages, declaratory relief, and injunc-
tive relief. Notwithstanding anything
hereunto the contrary, Assignee
retains an option to use judicial or
nonjudicial relief to enforce a secu-
rity agreement related to the
Manufactured Home or to foreclose
on the Manufactured Home. ... The
initiation and maintenance of an
action for judicial relief in a court
[on the foregoing terms] shall not
constitute a waiver of the right of
any party to compel arbitration
regarding any other dispute or rem-
edy subject to arbitration in this
Contract, including the filing
of a counterclaim in a suit brought
by the Assignee pursuant to this
provision.
In January 1996, Randolph brought
suit in federal court alleging that
Green Tree had violated the Truth
in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. § 1601 et
seq.) by failing to include the
requirement of vendor's single inter-
est insurance in its Truth in
Lending Act disclosure and had vio-
lated the Equal Credit Act (15
U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691(f) by requiring
arbitration of all claims. Randolph
sought certification of a class of
individuals who had entered into
similar agreements with Green Tree.
In response to the suit, Green Tree
moved to compel Randolph to arbi-
trate her complaint pursuant to the
arbitration agreement. Green Tree
also moved to stay the action pend-
ing arbitration or, in the alternative,
to dismiss it.
The district court granted the
motion to compel arbitration and
declined to certify a class. Randolph
v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 991
F.Supp. 1410 (M.D.Ala. 1997).
Concluding that all the issues raised
in Randolph's complaint must be
submitted to arbitration, the court
dismissed her claims with prejudice.
Randolph then sought review in the
Eleventh Circuit.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the
district court and held that if an
arbitration issue arises as part of a
broader action involving other
issues, and if the district court effec-
tively disposes of all other issues by
issuing an order compelling arbitra-
tion and dismissing the remaining
claims with prejudice, the order is
an appealable "final decision."
Examining the language of the
Federal Arbitration Act, the
Eleventh Circuit determined that
the phrase "final decision" was a
term of art that was of long standing
when Congress enacted Section
16(a)(3) of the Federal Arbitration
Act. The court reasoned that a dis-
missal with prejudice clearly is a
decision that ends the litigation on
the merits and leaves nothing for
the court to do but execute on the
judgment.
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that
the arbitration clause signed by
Randolph in this case was unen-
forceable because it failed to pro-
vide minimum guarantees required
to ensure that she could vindicate
her statutory rights under the Truth
in Lending Act. The Eleventh
Circuit stated that when an arbitra-
tion clause has provisions defeating
the remedial purpose of a statute,
the clause is not enforceable.
According to the court, the arbitra-
tion clause in this case raised seri-
ous concerns with respect to filing
fees, arbitrators' costs, and other
arbitration costs that might curtail
Randolph's access to the arbitral
forum. The court explained that the
clause said nothing about the pay-
ment of filing fees or the apportion-
ment of costs of arbitration, and
that it did not provide for a waiver
in cases of financial hardship. The
court also noted that the clause did
not say whether consumers, if they
prevail, will nonetheless be saddled
with fees and costs in excess of any
award. Additionally, the court found
that the clause did not say whether
the rules of the American
Arbitration Association, which pro-
vide guidelines concerning filing
fees and arbitration costs, apply to
the proceeding, whether some other
set of rules applied, or whether the
parties must negotiate their own set
of rules. The United States Supreme
Court agreed to review the Eleventh
Circuit's decision. 120 S.Ct. 1552
(2000).
CASE ANALYSIS
Section 16 of the Federal
Arbitration Act sets forth special
rules governing appeals from a dis-
trict court's arbitration order. Under
Section 16, an appeal may be taken
Issue No. 1
from an order that somehow pre-
vents arbitration from going for-
ward. An appeal may also be taken
from "a final decision with respect
to an arbitration that is subject to
this title." 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3).
Appeals may not be taken, however,
from "interlocutory orders" that in
one way or another allow the arbi-
tration to proceed. Napleton v.
General Motors Corp., 138 F.3d
1209, 1216 (7th Cir.1998).
The question presented in this case
is whether the district court's order
compelling arbitration and dismiss-
ing Randolph's clams with prejudice
was a "final decision with respect to
an arbitration." In considering this
question, a number of circuits have
distinguished between "embedded"
and "independent" proceedings. An
"embedded" proceeding is one in
which the arbitration issue arises as
part of a broader action dealing with
other issues. For example, in this
case, Randolph alleged a substantive
violation of the Truth in Lending
Act in addition to raising the arbi-
trability question. In an "indepen-
dent" proceeding, on the other
hand, the motion to compel arbitra-
tion is the only issue before the
court.
Green Tree argues that an order
compelling arbitration and dismiss-
ing an "embedded" proceeding is
not a "final decision" under the
Federal Arbitration Act. According
to Green Tree, settled statutory con-
struction principles govern the
scope of appellate jurisdiction under
the Act, and they preclude an
appeal in this case. Green Tree
asserts that the Purpose of the
Federal Arbitration Act and the
structure of Section 16 confirm that
an order compelling arbitration in
an "embedded" proceeding is not a
"final decision" under Section 16.
Disagreeing with Green Tree,
Randolph argues that the order dis-
missing the action with prejudice
was a "final decision" under the
Federal Arbitration Act. She asserts
that the plain language of Section
16(a)(3) and prior case law indicate
that a dismissal with prejudice is a
final decision.
As to the enforceability of the arbi-
tration clause, it is Green Tree's
position that the Federal Arbitration
Act reflects a strict presumption in
favor of arbitration of federal statu-
tory claims. It argues that the arbi-
tration agreement is enforceable to
resolve Randolph's claims under the
Truth in Lending Act and that
Congress did not intend to preclude
individual agreements to arbitrate
Truth in Lending Act claims.
Randolph contends that the arbitra-
tion agreement was unenforceable
because it compromised her ability
to enforce her statutory rights
under the Truth in Lending Act.
According to Randolph, the agree-
ment was unenforceable because it
failed to ensure that the costs she
would bear in arbitration were no
greater than those that she would
have incurred in court. She also
argues that the arbitration agree-
ment is unenforceable because it
prevented her and putative class
members from proceeding on a class
action basis, thereby effectively
denying a remedy to the entire
class.
SIGNIFICANCE
The Supreme Court is faced with a
split in the circuits on the question
of whether a district court's order
compelling arbitration in an embed-
ded proceeding is an appealable
"final decision" when it dismisses
the remaining claims. Eight circuits
(the First, Second, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth)
have held that orders compelling
arbitration arising in embedded pro-
ceedings must be treated as "inter-
locutory" and not final decisions
under Section 16(a)(3).
The Ninth Circuit explained that if
the substantive suit is pending, a
district court's decision to compel
arbitration of some or all of the
claims before it is not considered to
be final and therefore is not review-
able. In most embedded proceed-
ings, orders compelling arbitration
are treated as interlocutory because,
after the arbitrability issue has been
decided, other issues remain in the
case for the district court to resolve.
Accordingly, an order directing the
parties to proceed to arbitration
could not be considered a "final
decision" under Section 16(a)(3).
Where the district court's dismissal
of the action leaves no additional
issues for it to resolve, the First,
Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits have held that a dismissal
of an embedded proceeding without
prejudice is not appealable. Like the
Eleventh Circuit, the Sixth and
Tenth Circuits have also treated dis-
missal of a plaintiff's remaining
claims with prejudice as an appeal-
able final decision.
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), the
Supreme Court held that, as a gen-
eral rule, statutory claims are fully
subject to binding arbitration. The
Court explained that "[bly agreeing
to arbitrate a statutory claim, a
party does not forgo the substantive
rights afforded by the statute; it
only submits to their resolution in
an arbitral, rather than a judicial,
forum." So long as the prospective
litigant may vindicate his or her
statutory cause of action in the arbi-
tral forum effectively, the Court
stressed that the statute will contin-
ue to serve both its remedial and
deterrent functions. See also
(Continued on Page 16)
American Bar Association
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614 (1985).
If the terms of an arbitration agree-
ment actually prevent an individual
from effectively vindicating his or
her statutory rights, the clause is
not enforceable. Shankle v. B-G
Maintenance Management of
Colorado, Inc., 163 F.3d 1230
(1999). Because the beneficiaries of
public statutes are entitled to the
rights and protections provided by
the law, an arbitration agreement
covering statutory rights is not enti-
tled to enforcement regardless of
what rights it waives or what bur-
dens it imposes. Cole v. Burns Int'l
Security Services, Inc., 105 F.3d
1465 (D.C.Cir. 1997).
In Paladino v. Avnet Computer
Technologies, Inc., 134 F.3d 1054
(11th Cir. 1998), the Eleventh
Circuit held that forcing the plaintiff
to bear the brunt of "hefty" arbitra-
tion costs and "steep filing fees"
constitutes a legitimate basis for
concluding that an arbitration
clause does not comport with statu-
tory policy. See also Cole v. Burns
Int'l Security Services, Inc., 105
F.3d 1465 (D.C.Cir. 1997) (requiring
an employer to bear the sole costs
of an arbitrator's fees where the
arbitration was imposed by the
employer could preclude enforce-
ment of an arbitration agreement).
On the other hand, in Rosenberg v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999),
the court of appeals held that New
York Stock Exchange arbitration
procedures were enforceable to
arbitrate an employment discrimi-
nation claim where the record sug-
gested that most successful arbitral
claimants were awarded fees and
costs. And in Doctor's Associates,
Inc. v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975 (2d Cir.
1996), the Third Circuit enforced
an arbitration agreement where the
plaintiffs estimated total costs of
arbitration were between $28,000
and $32,000 and the arbitration
clause arose in the context of a
commercial franchise agreement
rather than in a small consumer
transaction or employment
agreement.
The cost of an arbitration proceed-
ing may be substantial. See
Edwards, "Where Are We Heading
with Mandatory Arbitration of
Statutory Claims in Employment?"
16 Georgia State University Law
Review 293, 306 (1999). Edwards
suggests that while "some courts
still subscribe to the fond, but mis-
guided view that employment arbi-
tration is invariably quick and
cheap," an average case may result
in arbitrator fees ranging from
$3,750 to $14,000.
According to the Wall Street
Journal, arbitrators may charge up
to $600 per hour. An article in the
New York Law Journal listed cases
involving arbitration fees between
$24,000 and $82,000. Brecher,
"Putting the Reins on Employment
Arbitration: Courts Safeguard
Employee Rights," N.YL.J. (Aug. 24,
1999).
Some courts will not permit class
actions to proceed through arbitra-
tion in the absence of an express
provision for them. See, e.g.,
Champ v. Siegal Trading Co., 55
F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding
that Section 4 of the Federal
Arbitration Act requires that the
agreement be enforced as drafted,
precluding class actions absent an
express provision for them).
Other courts have declined to
enforce arbitration agreements that
would have foreclosed the availabili-
ty of class actions under the Truth
in Lending Act and other consumer
statutes. See, e.g., Johnson v. Tele-
Cash, Inc., 85 F.Supp.2d 264 (D.Del.
1999).
A similar case involving the Truth in
Lending Act is presently pending
before the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit. In that case, the
district court denied the defendants'
motion to compel arbitration.
Johnson v. Tele-Cash, Inc., 82
F.Supp.3d 264 (D.Del. 1999). The
district court held that there was an
"inherent conflict" between the
Truth in Lending Act's provision for
class actions and arbitration.
This case provides the Court with
an opportunity to clarify its holding
in Gilmer that, as a general rule,
statutory claims are fully subject to
binding arbitration. In addition, the
Court may provide guidance as to
when a decision compelling arbitra-
tion may be appealed. Given the
increase in agreements purporting
to require arbitration of statutory
claims, this decision will have a sub-
stantial impact on businesses as well
as consumers and employees.
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